How the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) Developed its Relationship with Iran and Hajj Ramadan

Collaboration Born from Marj al-Zuhur

A photo taken during one of the last meetings between Ismail Haniyeh, Saleh al-Arouri, and Hajj Ramadan

0. Introduction

One might think that, given the frequency the (mistaken) claim that Hamas is a “proxy” of Iran, there would be significant research on how exactly the relationship transpired. This, however, is far from the case, as the early meetings and consultations between delegates of Hamas and Iran largely relegated to clandestine archival annals and untranslated witness accounts. I have, in turn, attempted to correct this glaring oversight.

This article recounts the beginning of the Iran-Hamas relationship and the close collaboration cultivated between Mohammad Saeed Izadi (“Hajj Ramadan”) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Palestinian resistance—chiefly, though not exclusively, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). Consulting various archival resources, witness accounts, and primary sources circulated in Arabic platforms, I seek to illuminate the historical record by focusing on the earliest points of contact. Part I describes Mojtaba Abtahi’s meetings with the Palestinian Islamic Movement in 1985 at a hotel in the Cypriot city of Larnaca and, following Ayatollah Khamenei’s exhortations, an Iranian delegation represented by Homayoun Alizadeh and Asghar Mohammad meeting Hamas leaders Musa Abu Marzouk and Khalil al-Quqa in the United Arab Emirates in 1992. It also adumbrates the significance of Iran’s 1991 Conference in Support of the Intifada. Part II turns to Hajj Ramadan’s 1992 fraternization with Hamas leaders in southern Lebanon, when over 400 Palestinian leaders from the Islamic movement were exiled by the occupation. After elaborating on the legacy of this introduction, which galvanized shared military training and weapons-system engineering between the IRGC and Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, I conclude by reproducing two obituary letters, hitherto not translated into English—one by the Secretary-General of PIJ, Commander Ziyad al-Nakhalah, and another by Hamas political bureau leader Khalil al-Hayya—published after Hajj Ramadan’s recent martyrdom by the Zionist entity on 21 June 2025.

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I. Mojtaba Abtahi, Ayatollah Khamenei, and Madrid

The history behind how Iran and Hamas developed their working relationship has not been properly explicated in the extant English-language scholarship. As recounted by Hossein Sheikh al-Islam, who was a prominent Iranian diplomat and among the most influential figures in building Iran’s relationship with the Palestinian Islamic Movement, Iran had initially reached out to the burgeoning Islamic Movement in Palestine via diplomatic channels, with this taking place several years before the formation of Hamas on 7 December 1987.[1][2] Mojtaba Abtahi, who would become the Secretary-General of Iran’s Conference in Support of the Intifada, became the first Iranian official to meet with a delegation from the Islamic Movement in Palestine in 1985 at a hotel in Larnaca, Cyprus. This meeting was attended by nine men and six women who came from various regions of Palestine, some of whom traveled from the occupied 1948 territories; one such figure, Sheikh Abdullah Nimer Darwish, sent a representative on his behalf. So too did Sheikh Asaad Bayoud al-Tamimi, who was residing in Jordan. With the beginning of the First Intifada in 1987, other meetings were held in Algiers, Istanbul, and Ankara.

Sheikh al-Islam confirms that Iran’s work with Hamas was the result of a decision by Ayatollah Khamenei, based on a recommendation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IRGC’s external intelligence work (as the IRGC’s Quds Force had not yet been established). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs studied the file and sent its findings to the President of the Republic, Sayyid Khamenei, who also served as Imam Khomeini’s representative on the Palestinian cause and Lebanon. When Hamas emerged in 1987, Iranian decision-making circles held extensive discussions on how to deal with the movement and build relations with it. The Republic’s leadership settled the matter in a meeting attended by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Revolutionary Guards, and the office of Ayatollah Montazeri, who oversaw external activities.[3] On the basis of the participants’ recommendations, Ayatollah Khamenei decided to establish contact with Hamas and support it. Iran then formally initiated contact with the movement, but its efforts were initially met with rejection. Some within the movement’s leadership were wary of establishing relations with Iran, and some Iranian leaders also opposed such ties.

Relatedly, as Ali Asghar Mohammadi reveals, “there existed differing viewpoints [within the Iranian leadership] regarding the relationship with Hamas.”[4] While some encouraged establishing ties with the movement, others were more uncertain and advocated for waiting until it became clear what the Hamas movement’s presence and influence would amount to. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated relations with the movement, and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, and Sheikh al-Islam all played leading roles in shaping this decision. Iran’s efforts to establish relations initially encountered hesitancy from the Hamas movement. Mohammadi states: “We made contact with some representatives, but the first attempts to meet with the movement were unsuccessful. I heard from them that they were suspicious.”[5] Mahmoud al-Zahar later observed that these misgivings stemmed in part from the political dynamics between Iran and certain Arab states opposed to it, particularly in the Gulf region.[6] As Abu Marzouk recalled, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, represented by its secretary-general, Fathi Shiqaqi, played a pivotal role in encouraging Hamas to open up to Iran.[7]

After several attempts, Iran succeeded, through one of its channels, in obtaining a response from Hamas regarding the possibility of contact and arranging a meeting. The movement specified the location and time of the meeting, which Iran accepted, sending envoys to meet with several Hamas leaders. The meeting between Iranian officials and Hamas leadership took place in 1990. In elaborating on the details of this first meeting, Abu Marzouk recounted,

When I was in the United States, someone with a connection to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted me, and a lengthy discussion took place in preparation for the first meeting with the Iranian side, represented by Homayoun Alizadeh and Asghar Mohammadi. I participated in the meeting alongside Khalil al-Quqa, representing Hamas, and the meeting was held at a hotel in the United Arab Emirates.[8]

During the meeting, the Iranian side conveyed clearly the desire to build a relationship with the movement and affirmed that it was supportive of the Palestinian cause, recounting the history of its support and its stance following the victory of the revolution. The Iranian representatives expressed their eagerness to establish relations with all Palestinian factions, despite the close relationship it enjoyed with the Islamic Jihad Movement. Hamas expressed its readiness to do so and the meeting between the two sides focused on the strategic framework of the relationship, during which the Iranian delegation explained its stance on the resistance and the strategy it thought appropriate for militarily confronting the occupation. The Iranians asked the Hamas delegation about the movement’s vision for confronting the Zionist occupation, as well as about ambiguous points, including what is intended by the statement: “If we liberate a single inch, we will establish the State of Palestine upon it.” The movement’s response was that this did not imply recognition of the occupation. At the end of the meeting, Alizadeh offered Hamas Iran’s readiness to financially support it and the movement’s delegation provided him with a direct line of contact for Marzouk’s phone number. However, the movement did not, at that point, take up the offer for financial assistance, fearing that the fledgling movement, already under attack from Fatah, would be viewed as harnessed to the highest bidder.[9]

During the 30 October to 1 November 1991 interval that the PLO participated in the Madrid Conference, which prefigured the so-called Oslo “peace process,” Iran held a summit that sought to unify the resistance front. It invited various Palestinian factions to attend the conference in support of the Intifada, including the organizations that would comprise “the alliance of the ten fasa’il” (and, subsequently, the “Ten Resistance Organizations,” or TRO): Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Movement for Palestinian National Liberation–Fateh/Al-Intifada, the Movement for Palestinian National Liberation–Fateh/Revolutionary Council, Vanguards of the War of Popular Liberation, Al-Sa’iqa, the Popular Struggle Front, and the Revolutionary Palestinian Communist Party.[10] The short-lived Hizbu’llah Palestine, which existed from 1991–1993 and was founded by Ahmad Muhamma (who left PIJ’s shura council to form the party), was also present, albeit it was represented by Abbas al-Musawi from the Lebanese wing; this, however, proved fortuitous, as it also precipitated the first point of contact between Hizbu’llah and Hamas.[11][12] The conference marked a qualitative shift in relations between the movement and Iran. The Hamas delegation included Ibrahim Ghosheh, Imad al-Alami, and Muhammad Siyam, with Ghosheh heading the delegation. In his book The Red Minaret, Ghosheh describes the reception of the Hamas delegation in Tehran as “significant,” noting that Iranian officials arranged meetings for them with key decision-making institutions and senior state leaders, foremost among them Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[13] On the sidelines of the conference, the delegation also met with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, who expressed his country’s willingness to develop relations with Hamas. Velayati also arranged a meeting between the delegation and Mehdi Karroubi, head of the Martyr Foundation; Karroubi outlined the foundation’s work, expressed his willingness to cooperate, and pledged support for the families of martyrs inside and outside Palestine. Hamas presented two primary demands: the establishment of official relations and the opening of a representative office. Iranian officials agreed immediately and informed the delegation at the conclusion of its visit that they had approved both requests. Hamas appointed Imad al-Alami as its first representative in Iran and opened an office in Tehran in February 1992.[14] The office built relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with all Iranian institutions directly connected to the Palestinian cause. The Foreign Minister instructed officials to treat the Hamas office like other embassies in Tehran, which was immediately implemented.

At first, Iran limited its assistance to Hamas to logistical support and scholarships in military and civilian colleges and universities. At the conference, Hamas also inquired about possibilities for Iran supporting the resistance, particularly in light of Fatah’s declining engagement in the intifada. However, due to the circumstances of the Iran-Iraq War, the best Iran could offer at this point was limited financial support, for which the Foreign Minister and Director of the Middle East Department, Mohammad Kazem Kharrazi, offered his sincere apologies. Simultaneously, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani had launched a project consisting of reconstruction and economic liberalization. As Fatima al-Samadi recounts,

[..] although the movement’s relationship with Rafsanjani was good, due to the consequences of the war, the Iranian Foreign Ministry—which had previously provided significant political support to the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)—was unable to meet its need for money and weapons. The assistance it provided was limited, restricted to covering office expenses in Tehran and limited financial aid. However, these obstacles were gradually overcome as the dossier was transferred to the Revolutionary Guards, until they became fully responsible for managing the relationship at a later stage.[15]

In September 1992, the Hamas Political Bureau, led by Abu Marzouk, visited Tehran for the first time. The delegation met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri (Speaker of the Consultative Assembly), Velayati (Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Mohsen Rezaei (Commander of the Revolutionary Guards). The Hamas movement adumbrated its principled opposition to the “peace process” and secured Iranian support, with Iran thereby creating new cooperation channels to coordinate resistance support for Hamas. Whereas the 1991 conference had initiated relations with Iran, the Political Bureau’s visit expanded them into a multifaceted relationship with broadened cooperation across multiple fronts. Soon thereafter, the first Qassam training exercises were held in Tehran.[16]

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II. Hajj Ramadan in Marj al-Zuhur

Perhaps the single most important historical figure in the Iran-Hamas relationship has been Mohammad Saeed Izadi, or “Hajj Ramadan,” who arrived in Lebanon in the late 1980s as a young member of the post-revolutionary generation shaped by the Iranian Revolution. He established himself in the Beirut suburb of Haret Hreik, which functioned as a command center for the Lebanese resistance environment.[17] From this early period, his work focused primarily on the Palestinian question, which became the central axis of his activity.

During this phase, Hajj Ramadan engaged with Palestinian representatives in Lebanon, including participants in coordination frameworks such as the Follow-Up Committee for Palestinian Forces in Lebanon, which coalesced representatives from multiple Palestinian factions including Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the PFLP, and the DFLP; in fact, based on the historical record, Hajj Ramadan was involved with the Follow-Up Committee several years before Hamas and PIJ had joined the follow-up framework in 1992.[18] Thus, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Hajj Ramadan’s involvement with the Palestinian resistance mostly consisted of his fraternizing with leftist and nationalist factions, with this preceding his intimate collaboration with the two chief Islamic movements, which would play out in the fateful winter of 1992.

Notably, over a sustained period, Hajj Ramadan participated directly and through intermediaries in meetings with the Palestinian parties in the Follow-Up Committee. This allowed him to learn about the varying party lines espoused by the various factions; according to witness accounts, Hajj Ramadan helped coordinate joint activities between the parties and supported initiatives proposed by the Palestinian groups. In these interactions, he often emphasized service to the Palestinian cause rather than hierarchical authority. It is recorded that Hajj Ramadan fervently declared that “caring for the refugees in the camps is a noble humanitarian endeavor whose primary mission is to keep Palestine alive in the hearts,” adding that “if the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran laid the foundation for a serious resistance to liberate Palestine, then the liberation of Palestine will be the beginning of restoring humanity.”[19]

A decisive turning point occurred following the deportation carried out by the occupation on 17 December 1992, when, after the five days after the kidnapping and elimination of Zionist occupation soldier Sergeant Nissim Toledano by the Qassam Brigades, 415 Palestinian leaders and activists from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Jerusalem were expelled to Marj al-Zuhur in southern Lebanon. Yitzhak Rabin issued Authorization 97, empowering military commanders in the Occupied Territories to “expel inciters from among the local population.” In Gaza, the commanding occupation officer, Brigadier General Matan Vilnai, implemented this policy through a military order (viz., “Military Order 1086”).

This exiled group included a range of political and ideological currents: the Hamas members constituted the majority, numbering approximately 356 and including bastion figures such as Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Ismail Haniyeh, Imad Alami, Aziz al-Dweik, Ahmad Bahar, Abdul Fatah Dukhan, and Mahmoud al-Zahar; fifty-three belonged to PIJ; also included were independent figures and individuals associated with additional currents like the scholar Bassam Jarrar.[20] Within the camp, the deportees organized themselves into separate tents largely reflecting factional affiliations, with distinct groupings for Hamas, PIJ, and the smaller, separate arrangements for independents. The principal shared space was a central prayer tent and the makeshift “university” established by the scholars-in-exile.

Hajj Ramadan’s introduction to the southern Lebanese camp, which also served as a decisive moment in the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement’s decades-long kinship, is recorded as follows:

Iran seized the opportunity presented by the presence of so many Islamic Resistance cadres in Marj al-Zuhur, where they established direct contact with Hamas and succeeded in gaining the trust of the Palestinian resistance. The Lebanese Hizbu’llah played an influential role in building trust between the two sides.

[…]

The Iranians were eager to establish broader ties with the Hamas movement, and [Mojtaba] Abtahi’s meetings in al-Ranka, Algeria, Ankara, and Italy were not sufficient to achieve that. “Marj al-Zuhur” was the opportunity the Iranians had been looking for, recalls Abtahi, who kept a photo archive of that period. The Iranians dealt with educated leaders, as the Marj al-Zuhur camp included 20 university professors, 25 doctors, and more than 60 engineers from various age groups, who they demonstrated frankness and boldness in expressing their positions, even where disagreements might lie. Abtahi […] was among the first to arrive at “Marj al-Zuhur,” [and recalls that] […] “we formed a bond of brotherhood. After that first meeting—which had initially been tense between Abtahi and the Exiles—they began competing among themselves to host him in their tents. Iran […] reached out to the exiles, and its representative, Hajj Ramadan, held a meeting with Hamas leaders on the second day after the exiles’ arrival. Mahmoud al-Zahar, who attended the meeting, recalls that: “Hajj Ramadan introduced himself as an Iranian official and then told us: ‘We are at your service.’” The Iranians quickly provided significant logistical support to the deportees, including supplies necessary for a long stay—such as tents, blankets, and medicine. They also reunited some of the deportees with their families in private vehicles from Jordan. The Iranians heard from the Marj al-Zuhur deportees about their views on the Palestinian cause and the conflict with Israel, as well as their views on Arab and Islamic relations, particularly relations with Iran. According to a leader in the Revolutionary Guard, Mojtaba Abtahi, Marj al-Zuhur was a major breakthrough for the Iranians in the Palestinian cause.[21]

While the 1991 meeting with Ali Akbar Velayati laid the groundwork for the diplomatic relationship between Iran and Hamas, Marj al-Zuhur was pivotal in broadening the nascent resistance channels to include Hamas’ Gazan leadership. Hajj Ramadan treated the deportees as a unified body rather than as separate factions. He and his team assisted with establishing the Marj al-Zuhur camp’s infrastructure, including the erection of tents and the provision of essential supplies under harsh winter conditions. From the outset, he developed a plan oriented toward the deportees’ eventual return to Palestine, while simultaneously seeking to reduce factional divisions within the camp and to facilitate cooperation among its members.

Hajj Ramadan spent 13 months with the deportees. He ate, slept, and sat with them, providing for their needs to the best of his ability. Additionally, as Sheikh Naim Qassem indicated in his August 2025 speech, alongside care and attention, Hajj Ramadan provided “training” to the exiled Palestinians.[22]

Specifically, early during Hajj Ramadan’s stay in Marj al-Zuhur, Hamas broached the question of whether Iran could train and prepare some of its resistance fighters; Iran responded by organizing military courses for dozens of exiles. Although the Iranians had offered to train Hamas members prior to Marj al-Zuhur, the Palestinian movement had been somewhat cagey at first. But as trust built, in large part due to Hajj Ramadan’s presence, this dissipated. Palestinian groups then began traveling to Iran to undergo military exercises and workshops; as political scientist Tarek Hamoud underscores, this served as a critical opportunity for Hamas members to work and consort with the Revolutionary Guards and Hizbu’llah, leading to the development of training and funding initiatives.[23] Among the outcomes of this was the acquisition of expertise in explosives manufacturing, which subsequently flourished within the Qassam Brigades during the 1990s.[24] During this period, Qassam honed its ability to booby-trap cars and manufacture explosive belts; these operations, such as the 19 October 1994 Bus No. 5 bombing on Dizengoff Street in Tel Aviv—which killed 22 (in addition to the bomber) and wounded at least 48—and the 5 August 1995 bombing of Bus No. 26 in Jerusalem’s Ramat Eshkol, which killed 5 and injured 73, resulted in large casualties. Following Yahya Ayyash’s assassination on 5 January 1996, Hassan Salama commenced the “Sacred Revenge Operations.” After his release from his most recent detention term in March 1992, Salama moved between several countries, including Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Iran, participating in numerous military training courses that presaged his manufacture of the explosive devices with which he would exact revenge on behalf of Ayyash.[25] Majdi Abu Warda inaugurated the first “Sacred Revenge” operation on 25 February 1996, the day of the Zionist terrorist Baruch Goldstein’s Ibrahimi Mosque massacre (which served as a compounding incident, further precipitating Qassam’s retaliation), by undertaking a martyrdom mission targeting Bus No. 18 in occupied Jerusalem, killing 24, including 13 occupation soldiers, and wounding more than 50 others.[26] This was followed by Ibrahim al-Sarhanah’s operation, in which, wearing an explosive belt, he set out for a bus station in the city of Ashkelon; his martyrdom, which targeted a bus crowded with occupation soldiers, resulted in dozens of casualties.[27] Only a few days later Raed Shagnoubi, “killed 19 Israelis and wounded 10 others,” with this being followed up by “Ramez Obeid of [Palestinian] Islamic Jihad, who blew himself up at the Dizengoff shopping center in central Tel Aviv, killing 13 and wounding 120 others.”[28] Avi Dichter, then head of the Shabak, admitted that these operations constituted a “strategic threat to Israel.” This qualitative shift was partially the result of the military expertise Salama had acquired in Lebanon and Iran.[29]

As recorded in myriad scholarly accounts, during the period of exile the camp evolved into a site of sustained interaction between Palestinian leaders and external actors.[30] The deportees conveyed their experiences from within the occupied territories, while also engaging with the Lebanese resistance environment and with representatives linked to the Iranian state. These interactions contributed to increased familiarity among Palestinian factions themselves, many of whose members had previously lacked direct contact. The exile period indeed precipitated the development of a direct working relationship between Palestinian resistance organizations and IRGC structures. Prior to this period, contacts—particularly in the case of Fathi Shiqaqi and the PIJ movement—had already been established via the movement’s intellectual and political connection with Iran, including through Shiqaqi’s 1978 work Khomeini: The Solution and the Alternative. However, the Marj al-Zuhur episode marked a transition toward sustained, operational interaction on the ground, with Hamas entering the forefront.

A testimony recorded in 1999 from a leader within Hamas described this shift as follows:

The view of the Muslim Brotherhood within Palestine (before the emergence of Hamas) toward Iran and its stance on the Palestinian cause was marred by much distortion and lack of clarity. Yet the most influential factor in the development of the relationship between the two sides was the experience of interaction with the [Iranian] Revolutionary Guards under the supervision of Hajj Ramadan. This included constant communication and coexistence with the exiles, as he worked to secure all vital necessities—both essential and non-essential—and provided every form of support to the exiles, whether financial, moral, media, technical, artistic, health-related, or even recreational.[31]

The same anonymous account concludes that this “laid the groundwork for a strong future relationship, which began with the exiles’ return to Palestine on 17 December 1993.”[32] Supplementary contemporary testimonies from within the camp only further affirm this. Indeed, shortly before the deportees’ return to Palestine, Bassam Jarrar stated:

The view within Palestine toward our Iranian brothers was, at first, ambiguous; however, the expulsion brought the blessing of truly getting to learn our brothers’ true nature, which we were previously unaware of. Those who were exiled would then convey to the Palestinian people what they heard and saw, and they worked to correct any misconceptions back at home.[33]

Hajj Ramadan’s activities during the exile were organized through a structured operational framework. His priorities included ensuring the material well-being of the deportees, enabling their continued cohesion, and preparing them for return. To this end, he oversaw the allocation of financial resources, the organization of logistical teams, and the establishment of procedures for responding to requests from within the camp. In one directive to his team, he stated: “Nothing is impossible, and whatever the deportees ask for must be provided.”[34] Under this system, deportees received medical support as necessary, including access to medical treatment outside the camp, in addition to opportunities for political and family meetings facilitated through regional coordination. Arrangements were made to enable contact between deportees and their families, including the transfer of relatives from Gaza via Egypt and from the West Bank via Jordan to Syria and then Lebanon. This was also enabled in part by the cooperation of the Syrian state at the time.

With Hajj Ramadan’s assistance, operational support within the camp was continuous. Food and supplies were delivered regularly, and representatives maintained a permanent presence to monitor needs and coordinate responses. The camp also hosted organized activities, including the establishment of a local FM radio station that transmitted programming for both the deportees and their families. Immediately prior to the deportees’ return to Palestine in December 1993, provisions were made for each individual to carry items back to his or her family, reflecting an ongoing emphasis on maintaining social connections beyond the camp itself.

Following the conclusion of the Marj al-Zuhur period in exile, the coordination mechanisms established in southern Lebanon were further cultivated, with cooperation soon reaching the leadership register. In 1998, during the Hajj season, Sheikh al-Islam met Sheikh Ahmed Yassin while the latter was recovering in a hospital and invited him to visit Iran. Yassin accepted and visited Iran that spring, touching down at Mehrabad Airport on 28 April 1998. Upon arriving, Yassin was received by a delegation from the Office of the Leader of the Revolution and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Sheikh Muhammad Ali Taskhiri, who was head of the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization and the official for international relations in the Office of the Leader. Yassin then spoke to the local press, lauding “the Islamic Republic and its support for our cause,” before asserting that both Iran and Hamas are described as “terrorists” by the West because they both “refuse to surrender.”[35] Yassin then met Ayatollah Khamenei, the Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, and the foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, all of whom reaffirmed the Islamic Republic’s political and financial support.[36] Yassin remained in Iran through the week. On Thursday, 30 April 1998, Yassin and Khamenei visited Qom, where they met several prominent marajiʿ and dropped by a seminary for religious and jurisprudential sciences.[37] On Friday, 1 May 1998, Yassin delivered a speech before the Friday sermon at Tehran University.[38]

For his part, Hajj Ramadan remained in Lebanon until 1995, before returning to Iran, where he spearheaded the IRGC Quds Force’s Palestine file. From this point onward, Ramadan was entrusted with responsibility for supporting Palestinian resistance factions across multiple domains. He functioned as a principal intermediary between Iranian leadership, particularly Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and Palestinian resistance organizations, forming a sustained channel linking Gaza with resistance actors in the IRGC, Lebanon, and Syria. Over the course of more than three decades, he maintained this role as a central liaison coordinating political support, material assistance, and organizational cooperation.

In parallel, he participated in efforts to strengthen the operational capacities of these groups. His responsibilities included oversight of training programs, the development of human and technical capabilities, and the provision and coordination of material resources supplied through Iranian support channels. Beginning in 2000, Hajj Ramadan’s role expanded to include support for the social infrastructure surrounding the resistance. He contributed to initiatives providing material assistance to families of those martyred, wounded, or imprisoned, and helped broaden educational, health, and economic programs linked to affected communities. These efforts formed part of a wider approach aimed at sustaining the social base in which resistance organizations operated.

Across this period, Hajj Ramadan also maintained continuous engagement with senior figures associated with Iran and its regional allies, including Qassem Soleimani, Hassan Nusru’llah, and Ismail Qaani, overseeing coordination between these figures and the Palestinian resistance’s leadership. His work involved facilitating meetings, consultations, and exchanges between Palestinian representatives and Iranian political and institutional actors, ensuring the continued presence of the Palestinian issue within regional political and strategic discussions. He maintained regular communication with Ismail Haniyeh in particular, to whom Hajj Ramadan wired funds, including, in a recently leaked letter dated 24 September 2023 (that is, just two weeks before the beginning of Tufan al-Aqsa), a 4 million USD transfer.[39]

Izadi was martyred on 21 June 2025, following a strike by the Zionist entity targeting the city of Qom, bringing to an end a career spanning more than three decades of involvement in the Palestinian file.

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Ziyad al-Nakhalah and Hajj Ramadan

III. Obituaries

The Secretary-General of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, Commander Ziyad al-Nakhalah, wrote an obituary for Saeed Izadi, known as “Hajj Ramadan,” the official in charge of the “Palestine file” in the Quds Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). The obituary was originally published on Monday, 21 July 2025 and reads as follows:

All those we love leave us without saying goodbye. They close the door behind them and do not look back. Hajj Ramadan is one of those who left us without having finished his work. Until the very last moment of his short life, he affirmed that life is what we do, not just what we say. Throughout his forty years of presence, his was neither uniformly happy nor uniformly sad.

I met him in the late 1980s, and he was consumed by Palestine, al-Quds, and the resistance. He came from afar with such a spirited soul. We were surprised when we heard his accent, which resembled Arabic: “We are here to fight for Jerusalem,” he said.

Since that time, I have felt that Hajj Ramadan never left those very first words that he welcomed us with—we who came from Palestine to Lebanon because of the occupation’s expulsion of us from our homeland. He left us while repeating in classical Arabic that “we will resist and we will fight for Palestine.”

When he spoke to you about Palestine, it was as if he had just arrived from there. He spoke about the mujahideen and their leaders, all of whom he intimately knew. He communicated with them and kept up with their concerns. Indeed, this was the essence of Hajj Ramadan, who never knew rest as he unremittingly pursued his work in the service of the resistance and the resisters.

Sometimes he would grow angry and then calm down. He would rejoice and he would grieve. And Palestine was always his compass, never leaving his sights or his heart. He would push us, and we, in turn, would push him. He loved us and we loved him. Sometimes we would even disagree with him and he would disagree with us—but all of this, in the end, improved the resistance and made us stronger.

Hajj Ramadan was one of us—one of the people of Palestine. One is here reminded of the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, who remarked “Salman is one of us—the people of the household of the Prophet.”

He was responsible for the Palestine file in the Quds Forces, and he was among those best able to convey the Islamic Republic of Iran’s position on Palestine. He communicated with all the Palestinian organizations, advocating for us with the Iranian officials so as to provide the very best in the way of support for the resistance in Palestine. He would follow up and inquire about any needs and concerns we might have. Indeed, he always succeeded in assisting us and providing us with what was necessary to continue our plight of resistance. He never once tired nor grew weary. Whenever we asked him for assistance with any problem we faced, he would respond his well-known reply: “No problem.”

Hajj Ramadan is the story of Iran in Palestine and the story of Palestine in Iran. Both stories befit him and he embodied both stories. He devoted himself to jihad and to the resistance, to Palestine and its victory. He lived a life filled with arduous work and jihad. His name will remain in the records of the immortalized leaders who sacrificed themselves for Islam and for Palestine.

Farewell, Hajj Ramadan, a martyr on the path to al-Quds, until we meet again.[40]

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Hamas political bureau leader Khalil al-Hayya (who is currently one of the five acting Executive Committee heads, alongside Mohammad Darwish, who serves as the head or coordinator of the body, Khaled Meshal, Zaher Jabarin, and Nizar Awadallah) also wrote a thoughtful obituary, reproduced below:

With the martyrdom of Hajj Ramadan, Palestine, Jerusalem, and the resistance have lost a sincere and devoted ally, a loyal comrade-in-arms whose like is rare, who believed deeply in the complete liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea, and was convinced that the resistance in all its forms—military, political, media, social, and cultural—is the only path, no matter how great the sacrifices may be. Through it alone will the Zionist enemy be defeated, victory be achieved, and the land and holy sites be liberated.

The path of jihad and resistance began with Hajj Ramadan more than 33 years ago in Marj al-Zuhur in 1992, when the Zionist enemy exiled resistance leaders from Palestine. He remained with his fellow leaders there throughout the duration of their exile, visiting them frequently and offering them all the aid and assistance he could, discussing the cause, the resistance, and liberation with them, until they all returned to Palestine. Hajj Ramadan continued to build upon that experience and his understanding with the leaders there, remaining in contact with the resistance forces and factions, offering everything he could.

The resistance leaders and fighters in Palestine know Hajj Ramadan as one of their own, and they attest to his merit in his constant and tireless efforts to strengthen the resistance’s capabilities in all areas—from training and developing diverse human and technical capabilities, as well as the capabilities and resources provided by the Islamic Republic. This enabled the resistance forces in general—and the Al-Qassam Brigades and Saraya Al-Quds in particular—to advance through multiple critical stages in developing their capabilities. The resistance continued to build, accumulate, and develop, innovating and advancing further until its capabilities reached their current level.

For more than three decades, the martyr was engaged in supporting and backing the resistance and jihad in Palestine alongside his comrade-in-arms, the martyr Hajj Qassem Soleimani, then with His Eminence the martyr Sayyid Hassan Nusru’llah, Hajj Ismail Qaani, and other martyred and living leaders, foremost among them His Eminence Leader Ali Khamenei. Throughout all these years, the martyr Hajj Ramadan served as the link between Iran and Palestine and its resistance, a solid bridge between them, and a pillar of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s strategy in supporting and standing by the Palestinian people in their struggle to liberate their land and holy sites.

Throughout this period, we bore witness that the martyred Hajj was a man of profound wisdom and experience, deeply knowledgeable about the nature of the struggle with the Zionist enemy, and fully aware of the essence of the battle against it. We saw in him dedication, devotion, and steadfastness running through every fiber of his being. He was constantly striving to strengthen the resistance, his eyes and heart fixed on Palestine and how to support it and achieve the goal of liberating the land and our holy sites—this was always on his mind.

He deeply valued Islamic unity and believed in the necessity of uniting the ranks of the Ummah to support Palestine. He was steadfast in supporting all resistance movements. He was also always keen to carry out programs in all arenas to support the resistance and the Palestinian people, and to present the Palestinian cause to the peoples of the region in a way that served to revive the Palestinian cause within the Islamic world in general, such that the Palestinian cause continues to galvanize the Ummah.

He was attentive in retaining lines of communication with all Palestinian factions, demonstrating a commitment to the unity of fields and providing each resistance group with support and assistance. He closely followed every detail of Palestinian activities with the aim of strengthening and reinforcing the resistance and ensuring that the resistance forces as a whole were in the best possible condition and at the ready. In this context, it must be noted that he maintained close ties and direct lines of communication with the leadership of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and the movement’s leadership across various fields, at all stages and junctures.

We bore witness to Hajj Ramadan’s pure intentions. He was faithful to the mission of the Islamic Republic, led by His Eminence Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in supporting the Palestinian people and their resistance. He was diligent and tireless. Wherever we went, we found him present before us and with us—whether in Iran, Lebanon, or Syria. He was constantly on the move and worked with prudence and high spirits. Like a [living] martyr, he was a strong pillar of support for the Palestinian resistance forces; no disagreements of any kind could stop him or deter him from his resolve. His focus and efforts remained directed toward how to galvanize the nation and unite its voice around Palestine and its resistance in all its forms. From the day of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, we were in constant contact in Lebanon or in the Islamic Republic, and we could sense his intense dedication, using every tool and means, to support the resistance, ensuring the success of this blessed operation and the achievement of its grand objectives. We also met with him at every stage, either individually or alongside His Eminence the Martyr Sayyid Hassan Nusru’llah and others amongst our brothers. He was keen to unite the Palestinian factions with all those who believe in resisting the occupation. He was keen to bring all the groups together on every possible occasion and at every step of the process, particularly during the Al-Aqsa Flood campaign.

He also always ensured that the movement’s leadership held periodic and regular meetings with all the leaders of the Islamic Republic, political advisers/thought leaders, and other influential figures such that ideas and views could be consulted and exchanged. In turn, the Palestinian cause remained present among the people, whether it be official circles or decision-makers.

We are not exaggerating in any way when we say that it was correct to deem him a representative of Palestine and the resistance in Iran, which he remained until he rightfully earned the title of a martyr of Palestine.

We saw in him a mujahid devoted to worship, devoted to obedience, devoted to drawing closer to God Almighty, longing for martyrdom in the cause of God, loving the martyrs and leaders, and always defending them; and so it was always his wish that his life would end in martyrdom in the cause of God. That is why we say today that our loss of Hajj Ramadan was a great loss for us in the Hamas movement, for the resistance factions, and for the cause of jihad in the way of Allah in Palestine. But our consolation is that he ascended to God as a martyr, rejoicing in meeting the martyred leaders, his righteous companions on the path, foremost among them the martyred leaders Ismail Haniyeh (Abu al-Abd), Yahya al-Sinwar (Abu Ibrahim), Muhammad al-Deif (Abu Khalid), Marwan Issa (Abu al-Baraa), and the list goes on, winding along the caravan of martyrs. We are certain that those who will succeed him will carry his message and the spirit and fortitude of the Islamic Republic in its support of Palestine and the resistance until its liberation and the liberation of its holy city and mosque, God willing.

It is worth noting that Hajj Ramadan’s sole concern was Palestine; indeed, it was deeply rooted in his thinking and consciousness, to the extent that anyone sitting with him—if they did not know his background beforehand—would have thought him a Palestinian through and through. We used to sit with him as he was one of the true leaders of the jihad in Palestine—an anonymous figure, yet clear in his wisdom and judgment, steadfast in his stance and resolve. And what fate could be more fitting for his noble struggle than martyrdom? How could a leader like him taste death except as a martyr following the path of Allah?

In these times, the confrontation with the Zionist enemy is intensifying and its arrogance and terrorism are closing in on the front of righteousness. The people of the resistance, especially in proud Gaza, are making them face our might. Such is the case throughout all of Palestine. We affirm that the blood of the martyrs will fuel our resolve and reignite our spirit. We renew our covenant with God Almighty to continue on the path they walked until the great victory is achieved. We are all confident that God is with us and that victory is near, and that the enemies’ onslaught is but proof of the soundness of our course and the correctness of our path. We must hold fast to our patience and steadfastness until God’s promise is fulfilled {And on that day the believers will rejoice}.[41]

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[1] Sheikh al-Islam was a diplomat and a deputy in the Shura Council. He also served as Iran’s ambassador to Syria. He was one of the students who seized the U.S. embassy during the Islamic Revolution. Until his death from coronavirus in March 2020, he served as an advisor to the Iranian Foreign Minister at the time, Javad Zarif.

[2] The initial point of cooperation between Iranians and the Islamic movement of Palestine took place through Fathi al-Shiqaqi, following the publication of his 1979 book Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and the Alternative. One of the historical leaders of the IRGC, Javad Mansuri (the first commander of the Revolutionary Guard), goes so far as to compare Fathi al- Shiqaqi’s influence to that of General Soleimani; in an interview following the outbreak of the Tufan al-Aqsa, he responded to a broadcaster who mentioned General Soleimani’s pivotal role in arming the resistance by saying: “It is indeed as you say, but there were also other figures whose role in the Palestinian revolution must be acknowledged, including the martyr Fathi al-Shiqaqi, who was among those who founded the Palestinian revolution.” See: “Who is the Founder of the Palestinian Revolution?”, Iranian Students News Agency, 4 November 2023.

[3] Fatima al-Samadi’s interviews with Sheikh al-Islam and Mohammadi paraphrased in al-Samadi, Iran and Hamas: From Marj al-Zuhur to the al-Aqsa Flood (Qatar: al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2024), p. 154.

[4] Quoted in ibid.

[5] Mohammadi quoted in ibid.

[6] Although some Arab actors interpreted Iran’s position on the Palestinian cause and its efforts to establish relations with Hamas as a pragmatism-laden attempt to secure legitimacy within the Sunni political semblance, Kamal Kharrazi markedly rejected this, stating: “We do not need Palestine in this sense; we do not view Palestine instrumentally. Rather, we consider it an entry point for defending a noble principle grounded in support for the oppressed and opposition to the occupation of Muslim lands.” Kamal Kharrazi, quoted in ibid.

[7] Paraphrased in ibid.

[8] Marzouk in ibid.

[9] For a review of Fatah members’ claims that Hamas was an alien Iranian imposition on Palestine, see: Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Beirut, Institute of Palestine Studies, 2000), pp. 176-180.

[10] Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Beirut, Institute of Palestine Studies, 2000), p. 180.

[11] Sayyid Baraka also left PIJ to join Hizbu’llah Palestine (in 1991). For more on Hizbu’llah Palestine, see Erik Skare, A History of Palestinian Islamic (London: I.B. Tauris, 2022), pp. 145-146. Also see Jean-François Legrain, “The Shi’a Threat in Palestine: between phobias and propaganda”, 2013; retrieved online (2 April 2026): https://iremam-base.cnrs.fr/divers/shia_sunnism_20091001.htm, which writes:

[…] in the early 1990’s, the creation of a Hezbollah-Palestine (حزب الله - فلسطين) constituted the first demonstration of a diversification of military aid from Iran and Hezbollah to the Palestinian Mujahideen. The founder of this Hezbollah-Palestine, Ahmad Muhanna (احمد مهنا), was a former officer of the Popular Liberation Forces, a unit of the Army for the Liberation of Palestine, created after 1967 to resist the new occupant within the territories themselves. Operating in symbiosis with elements of the Lebanese channel, the group maintained direct links with Iran and Syria, with its military camps being situated in the Syrian Hauran and the Lebanese Bekaa. Feeling deprived of its particular links with Iran, the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine thence tried to sabotage the initiative in appealing directly to the Guide of the revolution. After this episode, it created its own military wing, the Islamic Fighting Forces ‘Qasam’ (oath) (القوى الإسلامية المجاهدة قسم) which became later the al-Quds [Jerusalem] Brigades (سرايا القدس). With this Hezbollah-Palestine experience, the Lebanese and Iranian channels succeeded non [sic] only to find common ground and cooperate but also set up new alliances among Islamic Palestinian organizations. Indeed, Ahmad Muhanna’s deputy, Adnan al-Ghul (عدنان الغول), a refugee from the Gaza Shati camp, had joined early [sic] to the Muslim Brotherhood. But advocating armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine, he took his distances and had frequented various Jihad movement groups before becoming a key military element of Hezbollah-Palestine. Yet, following Hamas evolutions in the area of armed struggle, he rejoined his original movement in 1992 on [sic] and became deputy to Muhammad Dayf (محمد الضيف), the leader of the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades (al-Ghul was eliminated in October 2004). Thanks to Adnan al-Ghul, Hamas subsequently benefited from contacts with networks of the Lebanese branch at a moment when most of its higher leaders were banned from Palestine to southern Lebanon in 1992. At the same moment, links were established with the Iranian channel and became institutionalized from the holding in Tehran in October 1991 of the first ‘International Conference to Support the Islamic Revolution in Palestine.’

[12] At the conference, the Hamas representative, Ibrahim Ghosheh, requested Hezbollah’s support in confronting the occupation. Al-Musawi gave his word in response. Shortly thereafter, Hizbu’llah organized demonstrations against the Madrid conference, which prompted the Lebanese security forces to violently respond, resulting in deaths among the demonstrators. Hizbu’llah also carried out military operations against the occupation in support of the intifada, and as a result, the occupation’s military targeted Abbas al-Musawi’s convoy, martrying him along with his family.

[13] Ibrahim Ghosheh, The Red Minaret: Memoirs of Ibrahim Ghosheh (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre, 2013), p. 186.

[14] By the end of 1992, al-Alami left Tehran due to arrangements between the movement and Jordan, which had resulted in the movement’s leaders settling in Amman. In early 1993, Osama Hamdan became the Hamas representative in Tehran. In 1998, he was succeeded by Abu Muhammad Mustafa, who held the post until 2001. From 2001 until 2010, Dr. Abdul Muti Zaqout served as the Hamas representative in Iran, until he left for Yemen. From 2010 to today, Dr. Khalid al-Qudumi represents the Hamas movement in Tehran. Since 1992, the movement’s office in Tehran has remained open.

[15] al-Samadi, op. cit., p. 161. After the conference, Mohammadi left his position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and his official ties to the Palestine file were severed, though the relationship continued on a personal basis. He later took on other files related to the Arab region.

[16] Sheikh al-Islam in ibid, p. 162.

[17] Tawfiq Ramadan, “A Chapter in Hajj Ramadan’s Journey with Palestine: The Marj al-Zuhur Experience,” Al-Akhbar, 21 July 2025; retrieved online (31 March 2026): https://www.al-akhbar.com/arab/851183.

[18] Hamas appears to have joined the Follow-Up Committee for Palestinian Forces in Lebanon by, at the latest, September 1992. See: Nora Stel, “Local Governance of/ through Informal Refugee Camps: Revisiting Lebanon’s Palestinian and Syrian ‘Gatherings’,” Refugee Reception and Camps: Local and Global Perspectives (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2025), pp. 37-55, esp. p. 44, where Stel writes:

The PLO installed Popular Committees to provide services, security and political representation in the camps in the 1960s. […] The committees are regularly described as the gatherings’ municipalities, overseeing service provision and the related informal taxation, operating as a land registry and serving as intermediaries in judicial matters and social conflict. Officially, the Palestinian Popular Committees in Lebanon fall under the Lebanese office of the PLO’s Department of Refugee Affairs that oversees a Central Follow-Up Committee at national level, five regional Popular Committee offices and a Popular Committee in each settlement [….] Despite their official institutionalization and status as civil bodies, Popular Committees operate in a highly politicized way. Rather than being determined by the results of the prescribed elections, positions within each committee are allocated in a way that reflects the current power balance among the various Palestinian parties within the PLO, with the communities they claim to represent lamenting their nepotism and corruption. […]

The Central Follow-Up Committee for the Popular Committees in Lebanon requires its regional offices to ‘work towards the activation and improvement of the relations with the neighbourhood, especially with the municipalities in the cities and the surrounding Lebanese villages.’

[19] Tawfiq Ramadan, “A Chapter in Hajj Ramadan’s Journey with Palestine,” op. cit.

[20] H. Borini, Marj al-Zuhur (Beirut: al-Zaytouna Centre: 2012); A. Maswady, Ila al-Myqajaha, (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre, 2013).

[21] Fatima al-Samadi, Iran and Hamas: From Marj al-Zuhur to the al-Aqsa Flood (Qatar: al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2024), pp. 163-164, including reproduced quote from written interview between al-Samadi and Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahar from November 2022.

[22] “Remarks by Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem on the 40th day of mourning for the martyred commander Major General Muhammad Saeed Izdi (Hajj Ramadan),” Hizbu’llah’s Media Relations (website), 5 August 2025; retrieved online (1 March 2026): https://shorturl.at/4I9TB.

[23] Tarek Hamoud, “Differences between Hamas and Iran, Prospects of Future’s Relation 2010-2014” (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultation, 2015); retrieved online (1 April 2026): https://shorturl.at/50BKC.

A 1994 intelligence report produced by the occupation’s Shabak and reproduced in Ely Karmon, “Gaza/Hamastan, Platform for Iranian Destabilization of the Arab World,” ICT, 5 January 2009, claims that Iran was providing 3 million USD annually to both Hamas and PIJ, and that a thousand families of Palestinian martyrs or detainees from both movements received regular monthly payments from Iran. Given the biased sourcing, these claims should be treated sceptically.

[24] According to Rafael D. Frankel, “Keeping Hamas and Hezbollah Out of a War with Iran,” The Washington Quarterly, 2012, p. 59, this period saw Hamas receiving training from both Iran and Hizbu’llah, with Frankel writing that: “It is no coincidence that the first successful suicide bombings perpetrated by Hamas came in the beginning of 1994, after the group received instruction from Hezbollah.”

[25] Adnan Abu Amer, “A Dark March for Israelis. A Quarter Century Since the ‘Holy Revenge’ Operations in Retaliation for Yahya Ayash,” Al Jazeera, 30 March 2021; retrieved online (2 April 2026): https://shorturl.at/wdITo.

[26] “26 years since the suicide bombings carried out by Al-Sarhanah and Abu Warda,” Safa, 25 February 2022; retrieved online (2 April 2026): https://shorturl.at/G1TRl.

[27] “25th Anniversary of the Martyrdom of Al-Qassam Fighters Al-Sarhanah and Abu Warda,” PalInfo, 25 February 2021; retrieved online (2 April 2026): https://palinfo.com/news/2021/02/25/137484/.

[28] Adnan Abu Amer, “A Dark March for Israelis,” op. cit.

[29] See Ghassan Du‘ar, The Engineer: The Martyr Yahya Ayyash, Symbol of Jihad and Leader of the Resistance in Palestine (Amman/London: Filastin al-Muslima, 1997).

[30] See, for example, Daud Abdullah, Engaging the world: The making of Hamas’s foreign policy (Johannesburg- Afro-Middle East Centre, 2020), pp. 70-88.

[31] Quoted in Tawfiq Ramadan, “A Chapter in Hajj Ramadan’s Journey with Palestine,” op. cit.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Quoted in ibid.

[34] Quoted in ibid.

[35] Ghassan Bin Jiddu, Muhammad al-Makki, “He arrived in Tehran and defended Iran’s position on the peace process. Sheikh Ahmad Yasin to ‘al-Hayat’: Hamas’s priority is to intensify attacks against the occupying enemy,” al-Hayat, 29 April 1998; retrieved online (2 April 2026): https://www.sauress.com/alhayat/30954845.

[36] Leila Seurat, The Foreign Policy of Hamas (London: I.B. Tauris, 2022), p. 22.

[37] “Sheikh Yassin: Hamas Will Avoid Confrontation with the Palestinian Authority; Netanyahu Vows to Expand Settlements,” Al Jazeera, 2 May 1998; retrieved online (2 April 2026): https://www.al-jazirah.com/1998/19980502/p271.htm.

[38] Fatima al-Samad, Iran and Hamas, op. cit., p. 170.

[39] This is recounted in Haniyeh’s 24 September 2023 letter to Yahya al-Sinwar; retrieved online: https://shorturl.at/rlmkz.

[40] Ziyad al-Nakhalah, “Ramadan is one of us, the people of Palestine,” Al-Akhbar, 21 July 2025; retrieved online (31 March 2026): https://shorturl.at/aKjcP.

[41] Khalil al-Hayya, “Hajj Ramadan... Palestinian by origin and identity,” Al-Alam, 21 July 2025; retrieved online (31 May 2026): https://shorturl.at/l1Gc6.